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Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption

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Author Info

  • Marianne Bertrand

    (University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research Center for Economic and Policy Research, and Institute for the Study of Labor)

  • Simeon Djankov

    (International Finance Corporation)

  • Rema Hanna

    (New York University Wagner School of Public Service)

  • Sendhil Mullainathan

    (Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research)

Abstract

We study the allocation of driver's licenses in India by randomly assigning applicants to one of three groups: bonus (offered a bonus for obtaining a license quickly), lesson (offered free driving lessons), or comparison. Both the bonus and lesson groups are more likely to obtain licenses. However, bonus group members are more likely to make extralegal payments and to obtain licenses without knowing how to drive. All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries ("agents"). An audit study of agents reveals that they can circumvent procedures such as the driving test. Overall, our results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect transfers from citizens to bureaucrats but distorts allocation. (c) 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 122 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1639-1676

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:122:y:2007:i:4:p:1639-1676

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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Marie Baland & Karl-Ove Moene & James A. Robinson, 2009. "Governance and Development," Working Papers 1007, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  2. Bruhn, Miriam & McKenzie, David, 2008. "In pursuit of balance : randomization in practice in development field experiments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4752, The World Bank.
  3. William Easterly, 2009. "Can the West Save Africa?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 373-447, June.
  4. Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie & Maximo Torero & Angelino Viceisza, 2009. "Lost in the Mail: A Field Experiment on Crime," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2009-01, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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