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How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

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Author Info
John A List
Daniel M Sturm

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Abstract

This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. We develop a two-dimensional political agency model, in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the incumbent should manipulate the secondary policy to attract voters. We test our model by using panel data on environmental policy choices in the U. S. states. In contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, we find that there are strong effects of electoral incentives. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/qjec.121.4.1249
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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 121 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1249-1281
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:121:y:2006:i:4:p:1249-1281

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
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  6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Congleton, Roger D, 1992. "Political Institutions and Pollution Control," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(3), pages 412-21, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Oates, Wallace E. & Portney, Paul R., 2003. "The political economy of environmental policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 325-354 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 2000. "Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C62-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2003. "Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 241-251, March. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. McAusland, Carol, 2003. "Voting for pollution policy: the importance of income inequality and openness to trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 425-451, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joan Canton, 2009. "Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies policies," Working Papers 2009.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. Finan, Frederico & Ferraz, Claudio, 2005. "Reelection Incentives and Political Corruption: Evidence from Brazilian Audit Reports," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19544, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  3. Mirabelle Muuls & Dimitra Petropoulou, 2007. "A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College," Economics Series Working Papers 372, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas I Renstrom, 2005. "Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 38, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
  5. Fredriksson, Per & Mamun, Khawaja, 2009. "Gubernatorial Reputation and Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?," Working Papers 2009002, Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  6. Fredriksson, Per & Mamun, Khawaja, 2009. "Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States," Working Papers 2009003, Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  7. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," Working Papers 346, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2005. "Democracy Deficits, Inequality and Pollution. A Politico-Economic Analysis," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-323, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  11. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "On the Link Between Democracy and Environment," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-355, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  12. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2008. "Secondary Issues and Party Politics: An Application to Environmental Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mario Jametti & Marius Brülhart, 2007. "Does Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?," Working Papers 2007_7, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2007. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit Reports," IZA Discussion Papers 2843, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  15. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Per Fredriksson & Herman Vollebergh, 2009. "Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 205-221, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," Working Papers 964, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  18. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2009. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2007. "Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 49, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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