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Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise

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Author Info
Humberto Llavador
Robert J. Oxoby

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Abstract

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: when (1) there exists an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries. © 2005 MIT Press

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 120 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 1155-1192
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:120:y:2005:i:3:p:1155-1192

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roland Benabou, 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 96-129, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Theo S Eicher & Cecilia Garcia Penalosa, . "Inequality and Growth," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0083, Department of Economics at the University of Washington. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-127, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 2001. "The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World," NBER Working Papers 8512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Adelman, Irma, 1999. "The role of government in economic development," CUDARE Working Paper Series 890, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy. [Downloadable!]
  12. John P. Conley & Akram Temimi, 2001. "Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups' Preferences Conflict," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 79-102, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Magnac, Thierry & Postel-Vinay, Gilles, 1997. "Wage Competition between Agriculture and Industry in Mid-Nineteenth Century France," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-26, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jeremy Greenwood, 1999. "The Third Industrial Revolution," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, pages 2-12. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Graziella Bertocchi, 2006. "The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 43-70, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Saint-Paul, Gilles & Verdier, Thierry, 1993. "Education, democracy and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 399-407, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Graziella Bertocchi, 2007. "The Enfranchisement of Women and the Welfare State," IZA Discussion Papers 2922, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Gradstein, Mark, 2005. "Democracy, Property Rights, Redistribution and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 5130, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2008. "Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 844, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2007. "The Transition to Democracy : Collective Action and Intra-elite Confict," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 807, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Graziella Bertocchi, 2007. "The Vanishing Bequest Tax: The Comparative Evolution of Bequest Taxation in Historical Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 2578, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Mario Chacon & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"," NBER Working Papers 12789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Fali Huang, 2006. "The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development," Working Papers 22-2006, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2008. "Democratic Errors," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2008-2, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Fali Huang, 2007. "The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development from Monarchy to Democracy," Working Papers 07-2007, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Robert Oxoby, 2009. "Understanding Social Inclusion, Social Cohesion and Social Capital," Working Papers 2009-11, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 22 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
  11. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2007. "Public Sector Capital and the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," Discussion Papers 07-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  12. Sayantan Ghosal & Eugenio Proto, 2006. "Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Intra-Elite Conflict and Risk Sharing," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_032, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade. [Downloadable!]
  13. Raquel Fernández, 2009. "Women's Rights and Development," NBER Working Papers 15355, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2006. "Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 750, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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