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Contract Design and Self-control: Theory and Evidence

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Author Info
Stefano Della Vigna
Ulrike Malmendier
Abstract

How do rational firms respond to consumer biases? In this paper we analyze the profit-maximizing contract design of firms if consumers have time-inconsistent preferences and are partially naive about it. We consider markets for two types of goods: goods with immediate costs and delayed benefits (investment goods) such as health club attendance, and goods with immediate benefits and delayed costs (leisure goods) such as credit card-financed consumption. We establish three features of the p rofit-maximizing contract design with partially naive time-inconsistent consumers. First, firms price investment goods below marginal cost. Second, firms price leisure goods above marginal cost. Third, for all types of goods firms introduce switching costs and charge back-loaded fees. The contractual design targets consumer misperception of future consumption and underestimation of the renewal probability. The predictions of the theory match the empirical contract design in the credit card, gambling, h ealth club, life insurance, mail order, mobile phone, and vacation time-sharing industries. We also show that time inconsistency has adverse effects on consumer welfare only if consumers are naive. © 2004 MIT Press

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 119 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 353-402
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:119:y:2004:i:2:p:353-402

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  2. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2008. "Behavioral Aspects of Price Setting, and Their Policy Implications," NBER Working Papers 13754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven R. Grenadier & Neng Wang, 2006. "Investment Under Uncertainty and Time-Inconsistent Preferences," NBER Working Papers 12042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Marianne Bertrand & Dean S. Karlan & Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir & Jonathan Zinman, 2005. "What's Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market," Working Papers 918, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Sumit Agarwal & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Chunlin Liu & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2006. "Do consumers choose the right credit contracts?," Working Paper Series WP-06-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  6. B. Luppi, 2006. "Price Competition over Boundedly Rational Agents," Working Papers 565, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  7. Andrea Patacconi & Florian Ederer, MIT, 2005. "Interpersonal Comparison, Status and Ambition in Organisations," Economics Series Working Papers 222, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2006. "Incentives and Self Control," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001262, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2004. "The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing," Working Papers 04-07, NET Institute, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  10. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2005. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 11755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Susanna Esteban & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2004. "Optimal menu of menus with self-control preferences," Discussion Papers 0405-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Donald P. Morgan, 2007. "Defining and detecting predatory lending," Staff Reports 273, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  13. Rohde,Kirsten I.M., 2005. "A Reason for Sophisticated Investors not to seize Arbitrage Opportunities in Markets without Frictions," Research Memoranda 053, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  14. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2008. "Performance of Procrastinators: On the Value of Deadlines," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Philip Bond & David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, 2006. "Predatory lending in rational world," Working Papers 06-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  16. Stefano DellaVigna & Joshua Pollet, 2005. "Investor Inattention, Firm Reaction, and Friday Earnings Announcements," NBER Working Papers 11683, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Azar, Ofer H., 2006. "Behavioral industrial organization, firm strategy, and consumer economics," MPRA Paper 4484, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  19. Nava Ashraf & James Berry & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2007. "Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia," NBER Working Papers 13247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June. [Downloadable!]
  21. David Laibson & Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, 2005. "Estimating Discount Functions with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000643, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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