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Multilateral Contracting And The Employment Relationship

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Author Info
Jonathan Levin

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Abstract

This paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations. It investigates the trade-off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole (multilateral relational contracts), and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees (bilateral relational contracts). Multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments, improving motivation, but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment. Bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement. The framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation, why firms rely on temporary employees, and the adoption of two-tier workforces. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 117 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 1075-1103
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:117:y:2002:i:3:p:1075-1103

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  8. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2005. "Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts," Discussion Papers 2005/7, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007. "Relative Performance Evaluation, Agent Hold-Up and Firm Organization," Discussion Papers 2007/26, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2006. "The rise of individual performance pay," Discussion Papers 2006/22, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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  11. E. Han Kim & Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, 2006. "Are Elite Universities Losing Their Competitive Edge?," NBER Working Papers 12245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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