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A Simple Model Of Voice

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Author Info
Abhijit Banerjee
Rohini Somanathan

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Abstract

We think of voice as a means of information aggregation within groups operating in a variety of settings. We explore how the characteristics of groups and their leaders influence voice. In relatively homogeneous groups, members farthest away from the leader have the best incentives to provide information, and their voice tends to moderate policy decisions. In large heterogeneous groups where leaders cannot identify individual members, the possibilities for informational exchange are severely limited, and any communication that exists pushes policies farther to the extreme. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 116 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 189-227
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:116:y:2001:i:1:p:189-227

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