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Electoral Competition Under The Threat Of Political Unrest

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Author Info
Matthew Ellman
Leonard Wantchekon

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Abstract

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a "centrist" policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, "posturing" by the strong party leads to platform divergence. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 115 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 499-531
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:115:y:2000:i:2:p:499-531

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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  1. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1999. "A Theory of Political Transitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Adam Przeworski, 2005. "Democracy as an equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 253-273, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Londregan, John & Vindigni, Andrea, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Papers 10-04-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2006. "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear," NBER Working Papers 12573, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ashish Chaturvedi, 2005. "Rigging elections with violence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 189-202, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sanna Nurmikko, 2008. "Survival of Political Leadership," Economics Discussion Papers 652, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Humberto Llavador, 2001. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Economics Working Papers 571, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, 2009. "Does Timing og Elections Instigate Riots? A Subnational Study of 16 Indian States, 1958-2004," Working Papers id:1835, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
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