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Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers

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Author Info
Judith Chevalier
Glenn Ellison

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Abstract

We examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. Using data from 1992-1994, we find that "termination" is more performance-sensitive for younger managers. We identify possible implicit incentives created by the terminationperformance relationship. The shape of the termination-performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk. Direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to ''herd'' into popular sectors. Consistent with these incentives, we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios. Promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 114 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 389-432
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:2:p:389-432

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