The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
AbstractThis paper examines the evolutionary foundations of bilateral bargaining behavior. Interaction is assumed to be personal in the sense that agents may recognize each others' bargaining strategies. In particular, the model allows interaction between 'obstinate' agents, whose demands are independent of the opponent, and 'sophisticated' agents, who adapt to their opponent's expected play. When the pie's size is certain, evolution favors obstinate agents who insist on getting at least half the pie. The unique outcome is an equal split. In sufficiently noisy environments, sophisticated behavior appears in equilibrium together with greedy obstinate behavior. There is then a positive probability of conflict. Copyright 1997, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 112 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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