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The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior

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Author Info
Ellingsen, Tore

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Abstract

This paper examines the evolutionary foundations of bilateral bargaining behavior. Interaction is assumed to be personal in the sense that agents may recognize each others' bargaining strategies. In particular, the model allows interaction between 'obstinate' agents, whose demands are independent of the opponent, and 'sophisticated' agents, who adapt to their opponent's expected play. When the pie's size is certain, evolution favors obstinate agents who insist on getting at least half the pie. The unique outcome is an equal split. In sufficiently noisy environments, sophisticated behavior appears in equilibrium together with greedy obstinate behavior. There is then a positive probability of conflict. Copyright 1997, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 112 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 581-602
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:2:p:581-602

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  1. Lopomo, G. & Ok, E.A., 1998. "Bargaining, Independence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," Working Papers 98-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. W. Bentley MacLeod, 1996. "Decision, Contract and Emotion: Some Economics for a Complex and Confusing World," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 336., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Isabelle Leroux & Alain Berro, 2005. "Modelling bargaining behaviors within biotech clusters - Towards the "power of the weak" emergence?," ERSA conference papers ersa05p173, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  5. Poulsen, Anders, 2002. "On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency," Working Papers 02-5, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 358, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  8. Leroux, Isabelle, 2000. "The Role Of Negotiation In The Structuring Of Territory: The Case Of Biotechnologies In Toulouse," ERSA conference papers ersa00p71, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  9. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2000. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 357, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  13. Giuseppe Lopomo & Efe A Ok, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000114, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auction and Double Auctions," Working Papers 2007-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  16. Jack Robles, 2008. "Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 19-36, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Kevin Hasker, 2004. "The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution," Departmental Working Papers 0406, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2003. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  19. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Territorial Bargaining," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 343., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Younghwan In, 2005. "A Fictitious-Play Model of Bargaining To Implement the Nash Solution," Departmental Working Papers wp0509, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Sven Fischer, 2005. "Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-36, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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