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Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games

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  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • Levine, David K

Abstract

In some experiments, rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. The authors bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, they suppose that the observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their opponents' play. Consequently, in an extensive-form game, some actions that are not optimal given the true distribution of opponents' play could be optimal given available information. The authors find that average losses are small: $0.03 to $0.64 per player with stakes between $2.00 and $30.00. In one of the three experiments they examine, this also implies a narrow range of outcome. Copyright 1997, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 112 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 507-36

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:2:p:507-36

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  1. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  2. Hey, John D & Orme, Chris, 1994. "Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1291-1326, November.
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