Marriage and Class
AbstractHere the authors consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable. They utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets. The authors impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it. Several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria. The model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria, even with constant returns to matching. Copyright 1997, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 112 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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