It is a common belief that the existence of involuntary unemployment implies that wages are too high and that wage moderation should be encouraged as a way to keep unemployment down. This paper argues for a reconsideration of this view by showing that it is possible for a binding minimum wage to reduce unemployment or increase employment even if there is involuntary unemployment. Copyright 1995, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Volume (Year): 110 (1995) Issue (Month): 4 (November) Pages: 1111-25 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Isabelle Méjean & Lise Patureau, 2008.
"Location decisions and Minimum Wages,"
THEMA Working Papers
2008-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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Shilov, Andrey & Tourovsky, Boris, 2008.
"The minimum wage in the dominant firm model,"
IAB Discussion Paper
200823, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
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