The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
AbstractThe authors analyze optimal task assignment when a firm needs to learn the abilities of employees. When projects require collaboration between juniors and seniors and only team outputs are observable, having juniors divide their time between two projects (junior sharing) is less informative about their abilities but more informative about their senior teammates' abilities than having juniors devote all their time to a single project (no sharing). In an overlapping-generations model, the authors show that no sharing is more (less) attractive than junior sharing if the prior uncertainty about abilities is small (large) relative to exogenous shocks to team production. Copyright 1994, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 109 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Other versions of this item:
- Meyer, M.A., 1991. "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," Papers 30, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
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