Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises
AbstractWhen the responsibility for output decisions was shifted from the state to the firm, and when firms were allowed to retain more of their profits, managers of Chinese state-owned enterprises strengthened workers' incentives. The managers paid more in bonuses and hired more workers on fixed-term contracts. The new incentives were effective: productivity increased with increases in bonus payments and in contract workers. The increase in autonomy raised workers' incomes (but not managers' incomes) and investment in the enterprise, but tended not to raise remittances to the state. Coauthors are Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan, and Barry Naughton. Copyright 1994, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 109 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.