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Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solutions

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  • Anbarci, Nejat

Abstract

Given a finite set of alternatives, players alternate making offers. Player one offers some alternative that player two can accept or veto. If player two accepts, it is enforced and the game ends. Otherwise, player two makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives and so on. If all alternatives are vetoed, a disagreement alternative is enforced. First, the author characterizes the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Then, the author shows tha t this outcome converges to the area monotonic solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set and a s the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Copyright 1993, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 108 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 245-58

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:108:y:1993:i:1:p:245-58

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/

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Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00335533

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Cited by:
  1. Nejat Anbarci & John H. Boyd III, 2008. "Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution," Economics Series 2008_11, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  2. Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 367-376.
  3. Nejat Anbarci, 1998. "Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/smorodinsky Solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 255-261, December.
  4. Younghwan In, 2008. "On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 251-264, June.
  5. Nejat Anbarci, 1997. "Noncooperative foundations for the kalai-smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(4), pages 403-411, December.
  6. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, . "Gradual Negotiations and Proportional Solutions," Working Papers WP2011/8, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, revised 09 Oct 2011.
  7. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.
  8. Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences," ESE Discussion Papers 98, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  9. Forgo, F. & Szidarovszky, F., 2003. "On the relation between the Nash bargaining solution and the weighting method," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 108-116, May.
  10. De Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 7414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:26:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Nejat Anbarci, 2005. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Working Papers 0518, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  13. Younghwan In, 2002. "On the Relevance of Alternatives in Bargaining: Average Alternative Solutions," Departmental Working Papers wp0214, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  14. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2011. "Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 453-470, September.

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