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Coordination in Split Award Auctions

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Author Info
Anton, James J
Yao, Dennis A

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Abstract

The authors analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated. Because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices, each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split. The need to coordinate is reflected in a split price that does not vary with private information. They also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner-take-all auctions. Copyright 1992, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 107 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 681-707
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:107:y:1992:i:2:p:681-707

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  1. Eduardo L. Gimenez Fernandez & Manuel Gonzalez-Gomez, . "Restructuring Or Delegating: Which Is Better?," Documentos de trabajo - Análise Económica 0019, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Li, Jin & Plott, Charles R., 2005. "Tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention: Equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets," Working Papers 1223, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Resale and Bundling in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 186, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  7. John McMillan, 2003. "Market Design: The Policy Uses of Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 139-144, May. [Downloadable!]
  8. Olivier Armantier and Erwann Sbai, 2003. "Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric," Department of Economics Working Papers 03-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Market Design with Correlated Valuations," Working Papers 1034, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Juan Pablo Montero, 2004. "Learning in Final-Offer Arbitration with Multiple Offers," Documentos de Trabajo 270, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  14. Maria Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine, 2004. "Strategic Procurement, Openness and Market Structure," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0904, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Kala Krishna & Torben Tranæs, 2003. "Menu Auctions with Demand Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 03-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Gary Biglaiser & Nikolaos Vettas, 2007. "Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and strategic buyers," Working Papers 24, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]
  17. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2000. "Competition and the Reform of Incentive Schemes in the Regulated Sector," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-58, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  19. Bergès-Sennou, F. & Chambolle, C., 2005. "The reciprocal producers' incentives to prey and the relailers' buying power," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200508, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
  20. Andrea Bonaccorsi & Paola Giuri, 1999. "Increasing returns and network structure in the evolutionary dynamics of industries," LEM Papers Series 1999/12, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  21. Gurnani, Haresh & Ray, Tridip, 2003. "A Procurement Auction Model Under Supplier Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 9990, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  22. Martin K Perry & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Auctions for Split-Award Contracts," ESE Discussion Papers 90, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Biglaiser, Gary & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2004. "Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints and Strategic Buyers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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