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Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results

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Author Info
Schotter, Andrew
Weigelt, Keith

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Abstract

This paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents. More precisely, the authors find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups. Equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and, hence, the profits of the tournament administrator (usually the firm). The effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group's cost disadvantage. When the cost disadvantage is severe, these programs significantly increase effort levels (and, hence, profits). The opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight. Copyright 1992, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 107 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 511-39
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:107:y:1992:i:2:p:511-39

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 1-33, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Morris Goldstein & Robert S. Smith, 1976. "The estimated impact of the antidiscrimination program aimed at federal contractors," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 29(4), pages 523-543, July.
  5. Leonard, Jonathan S, 1984. "Employment and Occupational Advance under Affirmative Action," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(3), pages 377-85, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Osterman, Paul, 1982. "Affirmative Action and Opportunity: A Study of Female Quit Rates," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(4), pages 604-12, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. James J. Heckman & Kenneth I. Wolpin, 1976. "Does the contract compliance program work? An analysis of Chicago data," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 29(4), pages 544-564, July.
  10. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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