The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation
AbstractInsider traders and other speculators with private information are able to appropriate some part of the returns to corporate investments made at the expense of other shareholders. As a result, insider trading tends to discourage corporate investment and reduce the efficiency of corporate behavior. In the context of a theoretical model, measures that provide some indication of the sources and extent of the investment reduction are derived. Copyright 1989, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 104 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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