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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 104 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 589-619
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:3:p:589-619

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