Unlike existing models that rely heavily on assumption regarding unions' distributional preferences, the authors present a simple model in which union seniority-layoff rules and rising seniority-wage profiles result from optimal price discrimination against the firm. Surprisingly, even when cash transfers among union members are ruled out, unions' optimal seniority-wage profiles are likely to be completely unaffected by their distributional preferences because of a kink in the utility-possibility frontier. This suggests that the simple technology of price discrimination may play a key role, hitherto unappreciated, in explaining union policies that affect the relative well-being of different union members. Copyright 1989, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Volume (Year): 104 (1989) Issue (Month): 3 (August) Pages: 485-505 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Buhai, Ioan Sebastian & Portela, Miguel & Teulings, Coen N & van Vuuren, Aico, 2008.
"Returns to Tenure or Seniority?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Buhai, Sebastian & Portela, Miguel & Teulings, Coen & van Vuuren, Aico, 2008.
"Returns to Tenure or Seniority?,"
Working Papers
08-1, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
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