This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Bargaining and Strikes

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Hart, Oliver

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A recent literature has shown that asymmetric information about a firm's profitability does not, by itself, explain strikes of substantial length if the firm and workers can bargain very frequently without commitment. In this paper, the author shows that substantial strikes are possible if there is a small (but not insignificant) delay between offers; and a strike-bound firm may experience a decline in profitability after a certain point. A brief discussion of the ability of the theory to explain the data on strikes is included. Copyright 1989, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28198902%29104%3A1%3C25%3ABAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 104 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 25-43
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:104:y:1989:i:1:p:25-43

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/

Order Information:
Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00335533

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Kyle Hyndman, 2005. "Status Quo Effects in Bargaining: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC," Industrial Organization 0511016, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, 2003. "Unions, Bargaining and Strikes," Papers of Peter Cramton 02ubs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 05 Sep 2002. [Downloadable!]
  3. Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2005. "Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 5276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 457-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. David Porter & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1989. "The Scope of Bargaining Failures With Complete Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 564, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Habib Ahmed & Stephen M. Miller, 1999. "A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership," Working papers 1999-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Chaim Fershtman & Zvi Safra & Daniel Vincent, 1990. "Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility," Discussion Papers 867, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.