Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry
AbstractIn industries with imperfect consumer information, the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis established firms. The authors consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of experience goods and services. Their model incorporates both moral hazard in an individual firm's choice of quality and adverse selection among potential entrants into the industry. They find that infant-industry protection often exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections. Copyright 1988, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 103 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
Other versions of this item:
- Gene M. Grossman & Henrik Horn, 1989. "Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry," NBER Working Papers 2159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
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- Kyle Bagwell, 1986.
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711, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bagwell, Kyle, 1990. "Informational product differentiation as a barrier to entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 207-223, June.
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