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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 102 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 243-63
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:2:p:243-63

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1. Axel GAUTIER & Dimitri PAOLINI, 2001. "Delegation and Organizational Design," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001026, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
2. Daniel Krähmer & Helmut Bester, 2006. "Delegation and Incentives," Discussion Papers 190, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bester, Helmut & Krahmer, Daniel, 2007. "Delegation and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008. "Delegation and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 664-682. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
4. Juan Carlos Barcena-ruiz & Jesus Rubio, 2000. "Withholding of Information as an Endogenous Entry Barrier," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 58, pages 08, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
5. Antonovitz, Frances & Buhr, Brian & Liu, Donald J., 1996. "Vertical Integration Incentives In Meat Product Markets," Staff Papers 13989, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.