Aggregation and Aggregation
AbstractWe discuss economic aggregation and political aggregation in the context of a simple dynamic version of the canonical political-economy model--the Meltzer-Richard model. Consumers differ both in labor productivity and initial asset wealth and there is no physical capital. Under commitment over future tax policy, and for economic preferences that imply aggregation in assets and productivity, the induced policy preferences for individuals do not depend on any distributional characteristics other than means. They imply time inconsistency, with taxes changing between the first and the second periods and staying constant thereafter. Political aggregation in the form of a median-voter theorem applies only in special cases. (JEL: D72, D78, E61, H23) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04-05)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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- Facundo Piguillem & Anderson Schneider, 2013.
"Heterogeneous Labor Skills, The Median Voter and Labor Taxes,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(2), pages 332-349, April.
- Anderson L. Schneider & Facundo Piguillem, 2008. "Heterogeneous Labor Skills, The Median Voter and Labor Taxes," 2008 Meeting Papers 835, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Facundo Piguillem & Anderson Schneider, 2013. "Code and data files for "Heterogeneous Labor Skills, The Median Voter and Labor Taxes"," Computer Codes 11-142, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Facundo Piguillem & Anderson L. Schneider, 2010. "Heterogeneous Labor Skills, The Median Voter and Labor Taxes," EIEF Working Papers Series 1002, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Nov 2009.
- Daniel R. Carroll, 2013. "The demand for income tax progressivity in the growth model," Working Paper 1106, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Barnett, Richard C. & Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Bunzel, Helle, 2013. "Voting for income-immiserizing redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model," Staff General Research Papers 36600, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Barnett, Richard & Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Bunzel, Helle, 2012. "Voting for immiserizing income redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2012-15, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
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