The Timing of Education
AbstractWe study an assignment-with-investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before (ex ante system) and after (ex post system) matching on the labor market. The ex post system is better at coordinating investment within firms whereas the ex ante system is better at reducing mismatches. We further show that the ability to transfer surplus within firms affects mismatches and the relative performance of the two systems. At high degrees of transferability, they are equivalent. But when transferability is very low, the ex post system outperforms the ex ante system, although with moderate transferability the reverse is true. (JEL: I21, I28, J31, J42) (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04-05)
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Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Gall & Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2006. "The timing of education," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7026, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Thomas Gall & Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2008. "The timing of education," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/101648, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
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- Gall, Thomas & Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2012.
"Mismatch, rematch, and investment,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
189, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Thomas Gall & Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2009. "Mis-match, Re-match, and Investment," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-189, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Andrea, Canidio, 2010. "Absorptive capacity, the allocation of scientists, and firms' research productivity," MPRA Paper 30257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2013.
"Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
13-060, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gall, Thomas, 2013. "Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 360186, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Andrea, Canidio, 2009. "The production of science," MPRA Paper 25218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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