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Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes

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Author Info
J. Lawrence Broz
Abstract

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are alternative monetary com-mitments that differ in transparency. While CBI is opaque and difficult to monitor, a commitment to a fixed exchange rate is easily observed. Political systems also vary in terms of transparency. I argue that the transparency of monetary commitments and the transparency of political systems are substitutes. Where political decision making is opaque (autocracies), governments must look to a commitment that is more transparent and constrained (fixed exchange rates) than the government itself. The transparency of the monetary commitment substitutes for the transparency of the political system to engender low inflation. Where the political process is transparent (democracies), a formal commitment to CBI can produce lower inflation because private agents and the political opposition are free to detect and punish government interference with the central bank. Statistical results indicate that (1) autocracies are more likely to adopt exchange-rate pegs than democracies, and (2) CBI is effective in limiting inflation in nations with high levels of political transparency. © 2001 The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 861-887
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:4:p:861-887

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  1. Ashoka Mody, 2004. "What is an Emerging Market?," IMF Working Papers 04/177, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, 2008. "Exchange Rate Regime Choice with Multiple Key Currencies," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp264, IIIS. [Downloadable!]
  3. Beth Simmons & Jens Hainmueller, 2005. "Can Domestic Institutions Explain Exchange Rate Regime Choice? The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions Reconsidered," International Finance 0505011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Fabrizio Carmignani & Emilio Colombo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2005. "Consistency versus credibility: how do countries choose their exchange rate regime?," International Finance 0502001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ralph Setzer, 2005. "The Political Economy of Fixed Exchange Rates: A Survival Analysis," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 265/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ilker Domaç & Eray M. Yücel, 2005. "What Triggers Inflation in Emerging Market Economies?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 141-164, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. S. Brock Blomberg & Jeffry Frieden & Ernesto Stein, 2005. "Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 203-225, November. [Downloadable!]
  8. Wray, Christopher R., 2004. "Fear Factor: How Political Insecurity Shapes the Diffusion of Financial Market Deregulation," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30607, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM). [Downloadable!]
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