Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union

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Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union

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Jonas Tallberg

Abstract

The contemporary debate on compliance has been framed in terms of two contending perspectives on how best to make states comply with international rules: enforcement or management. Whereas enforcement theorists stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency. In this article, I challenge the conception that enforcement and management are competing strategies for achieving compliance. Based on the case of the European Union (EU) and a comparison with other international regimes, I suggest that enforcement and management mechanisms are most effective when combined. The twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a "management-enforcement ladder" makes the EU highly successful in combating violations, thus reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon. An examination of regimes in the areas of trade, environment, and human rights lends additional support to this proposition; compliance systems that offer both forms of mechanism are particularly effective in securing rule conformance, whereas systems that only rely on one of the strategies suffer in identifiable ways. © 2001 The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 609-643
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:3:p:609-643

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Antoaneta Dimitrova, 2007. "Institutionalization of Imported Rules in the European Union's New Member States: Bringing Politics Back in the Research Agenda," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 37, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS). [Downloadable!]
Clifford J. Carrubba & Matthew Gabel, 2005. "Do Governments Sway European Court of Justice Decision-making?: Evidence from Government Court Briefs," Working Papers 2005-06, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
Hartlapp, Miriam, 2005. "Two Variations on a Theme: Different Logics of Implementation Management in the EU and the ILO," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 9, 06. [Downloadable!]
William Phelan, 2008. "Why do EU Member States Offer a 'Constitutional' Obedience to EU Obligations? Encompassing Domestic Institutions and Costly International Obligations," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp256, IIIS. [Downloadable!]

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