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Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Edward D. Mansfield
Helen V. Milner
B. Peter Rosendorff
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Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commer-cial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries. © 2001 The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal International Organization .
Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 477-513
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