Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence

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Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence

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Andrew Kydd
Barbara F. Walter

Abstract

Why are extremists able to sabotage peace processes in some cases but not others? And under what conditions will the public respond to such provocation and return to unpopular wars? We seek to show that extremist violence is not indiscriminate or irrational as many people have assumed but quite strategic. We argue that extremist violence intentionally plays on the uncertainty that exists between the more moderate groups who are attempting to negotiate a peace agreement. Using a game-theoretic model of the interaction of extremist violence and mistrust, we identify the conditions under which extremists will succeed and fail. We find that extremists are most likely to succeed in derailing a peace process when the targeted side believes that opposition moderates are strong. At these times, the public perceives moderates as best able to control and suppress extremists within their own ranks. When moderates are viewed as weak and unable to crack down on extremists, terrorism is more likely to fail. We discuss this finding, as well as a number of additional implications of the model, in connection with the Israeli-Palestinian case. © 2001 The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 263-296
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:2:p:263-296

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Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 859, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 4, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi, 2007. "Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers," NBER Working Papers 12910, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, 2005. "Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence," Working Papers 23, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jaeger, David A & Paserman, Marco Daniele, 2006. "Israel, the Palestinian Factions and the Cycle of Violence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, 2006. "Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence," IZA Discussion Papers 1923, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, 2006. "Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 45-49, May.
Jaeger, David A & Paserman, Marco Daniele, 2005. "The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," CEPR Discussion Papers 5320, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, 2005. "The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," Working Papers 22, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
- David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, 2005. "The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 1808, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]

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