The authors develop and test a model in which nontariff barriers are expected to be most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, a country is sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results, based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s, provide support for this model. These findings indicate that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge, and that more attention should be devoted to the interaction between factors governing demands for protection and those regulating the provision of protection in cross-national studies of trade policy. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.
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Volume (Year): 49 (1995) Issue (Month): 4 (Autumn) Pages: 723-49 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:intorg:v:49:y:1995:i:4:p:723-49
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