This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Hosli, Madeleine O
Abstract

Several member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have applied for admission into the European Community (EC). As the Single European Act and possibly also the Treaty on European Union are being implemented, the distribution of EC Council voting power takes on growing importance, since the range of issues to be decided by qualified majority votes increases considerably. Moreover, there are tendencies within the EC to render decisionmaking more transparent. Thus, the distribution of voting power will increasingly be a crucial aspect for the EC. The article shows that the power of larger EFTA states in an extended Council of Ministers would approximately equal the one of smaller EC states in the present constellation, while that of smaller EFTA states is comparable to the present voting power of Luxembourg. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 47 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (Autumn)
Pages: 629-43
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:tpr:intorg:v:47:y:1993:i:4:p:629-43

Contact details of provider:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Madeleine O. Hosli, 2008. "Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 076-096, March. [Downloadable!]
  2. Napel, Stefan & Widgren, Mika, 2002. "Strategic Power Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Christina Schneider, 2007. "Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 85-102, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  5. James M. Snyder & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group. [Downloadable!]
  7. Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 41-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Yener Kandogan, 2003. "DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-576, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.