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Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff

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Author Info
Hansen, John Mark
Abstract

This article explores the significance of tariffs as taxes, theoretically and empirically. In its first part, it develops a theory of taxation politics and applies it to the tariff. In its second part, it submits the theory to an empirical test, modeling changes in U.S. tariff rates from 1829 to 1940. The politics of tariff revision, it argues, followed from two characteristicsofthe tariff as tax: from the extent of the treasury's dependence upon it and from the distributive pattern of its burdens and benefits. Taken together, the article concludes, revenue dependence and distributive incidence account for several diverse aspects of American tariff policy, for including the structure of its coalitions, the shifts in its objectives, and the timing of its innovations. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 44 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (Autumn)
Pages: 527-51
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:intorg:v:44:y:1990:i:4:p:527-51

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  1. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Protection and the Business Cycle," NBER Working Papers 5168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Arnaud Costenot, 2006. "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A New Perspective on Protectionism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  4. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2006. "Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 133-163, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Arnaud Costinot, 2008. "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A "New" Perspective on Protectionism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-05R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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