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School-Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades in Elementary School

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  • Sarah C. Fuller

    (Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University)

  • Helen F. Ladd

    (Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University)

Abstract

We use North Carolina data to explore whether the quality of teachers in the lower elementary grades (K–2) falls short of teacher quality in the upper grades (3–5) and to examine the hypothesis that school accountability pressures contribute to such quality shortfalls. Our concern with the early grades arises from recent studies highlighting how children's experiences in those years have lasting effects on their later outcomes. Using two credentials-based measures of teacher quality, we document within-school quality shortfalls in the lower grades, and show that the shortfalls increased with the introduction of No Child Left Behind. Consistent with that pattern, we find that schools responded to accountability pressures by moving their weaker teachers down to the lower grades and stronger teachers up to the higher grades. These findings support the view that accountability pressure induces schools to pursue actions that work to the disadvantage of children in the lower grades. © 2013 Association for Education Finance and Policy

Suggested Citation

  • Sarah C. Fuller & Helen F. Ladd, 2013. "School-Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades in Elementary School," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 528-559, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:edfpol:v:8:y:2013:i:4:p:528-559
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Seth Gershenson & Stephen B. Holt & Nicholas Papageorge, 2015. "Who Believes in Me? The Effect of Student-Teacher Demographic Match on Teacher Expectations," Upjohn Working Papers 15-231, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    4. Cory Koedel & Eric Parsons & Michael Podgursky & Mark Ehlert, 2015. "Teacher Preparation Programs and Teacher Quality: Are There Real Differences Across Programs?," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 10(4), pages 508-534, October.
    5. Fuchsman, Dillon & Sass, Tim & Zamarro, Gema, 2020. "Testing, Teacher Turnover and the Distribution of Teachers Across Grades and Schools," Working Papers 20-1, Sinquefield Center for Applied Economic Research, Saint Louis University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    accountability; teacher quality; elementary school;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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