Aircraft Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, and Social Welfare: the Monopoly Case
AbstractThis paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse the effects of noise regulation on a monopoly airline's flight frequency, traffic volume, and aircraft 'quietness' choices. Two types of noise limit are considered: a cumulative limit on total noise at an airport and a limit on noise per aircraft operation. Tighter noise limits, which reduce community exposure to noise, cause airlines to reduce flight frequency and traffic served, thus hurting consumers. A welfare analysis explores socially optimal noise regulation, taking into account the social cost of noise damage along with consumer surplus and airline profit. © 2010 LSE and the University of Bath
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP).
Volume (Year): 44 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep
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- Chen, Yongmin & Gayle, Philip, 2013. "Mergers and Product Quality: Evidence from the Airline Industry," MPRA Paper 51238, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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