Collude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price and capacity setting in the Norwegian airline industry after its deregulation in 1994. Did the two airlines, SAS and Braathens, compete on prices and capacities (competition), collude on prices and capacities (collusion), or collude on prices and compete on capacities (semicollusion)? We reject the hypothesis that they achieved collusion, and we find the observed behaviour consistent with semicollusive behaviour and inconsistent with competitive behaviour. © The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy.
Volume (Year): 37 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep
Other versions of this item:
- Salvanes, K.G. & Steen, F. & Sorgard, L., 1998. "Collude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry," Papers 18/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
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- Andreas Nicklisch, 2012. "Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 515-532, December.
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- Stenborg, Markku, 2002. "Economics of Joint Dominance," Discussion Papers 834, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Clark, Derek J. & Jørgensen, Finn & Mathisen, Terje Andreas, 2011. "Relationships between fares, trip length and market competition," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 611-624, August.
- Markku Stenborg, 2004. "Forest for the Trees: Economics of Joint Dominance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 365-385, December.
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