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Moral Hazard in Traffic Games

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  • Pål Andreas Pedersen

Abstract

A two-person game-theoretical model is suggested in order to explain traffic safety behaviour among road users. A road user's outcome is dependent on her and her opponent's attitude towards aggression, her and her opponent's level of attention, as well as on external traffic safety conditions. The existence and size of moral hazard effects for different outcomes of the game are discussed, and an evolutionary equilibrium, endogenously defining the share of aggressive road users, is deduced, and shown most likely to increase as external safety improvements take place. © The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2003

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  • Pål Andreas Pedersen, 2003. "Moral Hazard in Traffic Games," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 37(1), pages 47-68, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:37:y:2003:i:1:p:47-68
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoy, Michael & Polborn, Mattias K., 2015. "The value of technology improvements in games with externalities: A fresh look at offsetting behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 12-20.
    2. Bergland, Harald & Pedersen, Pål Andreas, 2019. "Efficiency and traffic safety with pay for performance in road transportation," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 21-35.
    3. Sverre Grepperud & Pål Andreas Pedersen, 2022. "First and second mover advantages and the degree of conflicting interests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1861-1873, September.
    4. Yaron Hollander & Joseph Prashker, 2006. "The applicability of non-cooperative game theory in transport analysis," Transportation, Springer, vol. 33(5), pages 481-496, September.

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