Empowering Firm Owners by Separating Voting from Buying and Selling Shares
AbstractThis paper discusses a new system of firm governance. In the system, the responsibility for voting the shares of a firm (“voice”) is given to the people who ultimately provided the money, who, however, have to delegate it to proxy voting institutions. The system helps overcome collective action problems and conflicts of interest within firms, and it reduces the private benefits of control. The disadvantages for firm governance may be relatively modest. However, since the new system of voice is a conceptual innovation, the analysis of its effects is rather tentative. Further research and experimentations are required for firmer conclusions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Review of Social Economy.
Volume (Year): 68 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Aloys Prinz & Tsjalle Burg, 2013. "Public bads and private firms: efficiency and sustainability with different allocations of voting rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 423-445, December.
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