State Intervention and the Role of History - state and private actors in Swedish network industries
AbstractThree main theoretical positions towards state intervention and regulation are discussed in relation to the case of Swedish infrastructure. The positive, the normative, and the political transaction cost approaches are examined in relation to the historic development of regulatory systems in civil aviation, railroads, and telecommunications. The authors show that governance regimes have historical roots, and develop differently due to policies implemented by state agencies. Three points are illuminated with a view to the interaction between state and private actors in the transport and communication sector. First, the role and function of the state agencies as well as the political system itself point to the need for a more refined analysis of state action. The active role of state agencies is also discussed emphasizing the difference between political decisions and the implementation of such decisions. Second, the role of a historical perspective is discussed, arguing that it makes possible a better understanding of the reasons behind choices of particular strategies. Finally, there might be good reason to expect the state either to act solely as a rent seeker, or as a promoter of optimal solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Review of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 12 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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