This article draws on the experience of Bulgaria with two forms of presumptive taxes--the patent (licence) tax and the minimum social insurance income thresholds. It argues that there is an inevitable trade-off between efficiency and equity, which may drive presumptive taxation away from its initial objectives of simplicity and lower compliance and enforcement costs. Therefore presumptive taxes should not be overloaded with equity objectives, or used as tax incentives, but rather assigned to enhance collection efficiency and reduce the cost of voluntary tax compliance of the small business. The study concludes that their optimal use might be as licence taxes on micro-businesses and the self-employed levied by local governments rather than as central taxes on small business income.
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Volume (Year): 18 (2006) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 399-418 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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