On 17 August 1998 the Russian authorities devalued the ruble, suspended repayments of ruble-denominated government paper and announced a moratorium on the Russian foreign debt. By doing so the government brought the domestic banking sector to the edge of bankruptcy and risked losing the little international faith still remaining in its abilities to restructure the economy. In this article we examine the deeper causes of the crisis. After having analysed its antecedents we gather our new insights into a basic stylised model of the crisis. The outcome of the model is then linked to the actual data and events.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2000) Issue (Month): 2 (June) Pages: 141-163 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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