Are conditional cooperators willing to forgo efficiency gains? Evidence from a public goods experiment
AbstractWe use a two-person public goods experiment to investigate how much agents value conditional cooperation when symmetric positive contributions entail efficiency losses. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivity player to increase group payoffs when contributing positive amounts. Asymmetric contributions, however, yield unequal individual payoffs. To assess a priori cooperative preferences, we measure individual 'value-orientations' by means of the decomposed game technique. We find that contributions remain negligible throughout the experiment, suggesting that people are not willing to contribute positive amounts if this may lead to damage efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal New Zealand Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 45 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RNZP20
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- Abeler, Johannes & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2013.
"Self-Selection into Economics Experiments Is Driven by Monetary Rewards,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7374, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo, 2013. "Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards," Discussion Papers 2013-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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