Macroeconomic implications of voucher privatization in a model with incomplete information
AbstractVoucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in a high unemployment economy. The model builds on a two-stage sequential game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogenous probability of privatization slowdown; as a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an “undue” credibility cost in terms of employment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.
Volume (Year): 4 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?id=300262
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