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Information Manipulation Through the Media

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  • Hanjoon Michael Jung

Abstract

This article models media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence receivers. This article shows that if there is only 1 sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a coordination situation without information about their opponents' types, the sender could influence the receivers to make decisions according to the sender's primary preference by manipulating the information through the media, which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the receivers have contradictory primary preferences. This result extends to the cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the sender's primary preference is to maintain its credibility. In the case of multiple senders, however, when there is enough competition among the senders or when simultaneous reporting takes place, the receivers could play their favored outcome against senders' preferences, which sheds light on a solution to the media manipulation problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2009. "Information Manipulation Through the Media," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 188-210.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:22:y:2009:i:4:p:188-210
    DOI: 10.1080/08997760903375886
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernhardt, Dan & Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias, 2008. "Political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1092-1104, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 204-207, December.
    2. Armando J. Garcia Pires, 2013. "Media Plurality and the Intensity of Readers' Political Preferences," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(1), pages 41-55, March.
    3. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.
    4. Zhe OuYang & Jia Xu & Jiuchang Wei & Yang Liu, 2017. "Information Asymmetry and Investor Reaction to Corporate Crisis: Media Reputation as a Stock Market Signal," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2), pages 82-95, April.
    5. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
    6. Mullainathan, Sendhil & Shleifer, Andrei, 2005. "The Market for News," Scholarly Articles 33078973, Harvard University Department of Economics.

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