Access Pricing to a Digital Broadcasting Platform
AbstractThis article studies a television market where operators can sell access to programs and to advertising time. First, we determine the retail prices paid by viewers and advertisers to a monopoly platform when there are externalities between these two markets. We compare the prices that an unregulated platform would establish with the welfare maximizing prices. Second, we obtain the access charge that an independent programmer should pay to a television platform for using one of his channels. We show that the optimal access charge takes into account the direct cost of access and the platform's opportunity costs in the viewer and advertiser markets, which are affected by the externalities between the two markets.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Media Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/HMEC20
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- Jarle Kind, Hans & Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars, 2010.
"Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry,"
18/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Hans Jarle Kind & Tore Nilssen & Lars Sørgard, 2010. "Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 3004, CESifo Group Munich.
- Harald Nygard Bergh & Hans Jarle Kind & Bjørn-Atle Reme & Lars Sørgard, 2012. "Competition between Content Distributors in Two-Sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 3885, CESifo Group Munich.
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