Optimal infant industry protection during transition to World Trade Organization membership - A numerical analysis for the Vietnamese motorcycle industry

This paper proposes a framework to derive the optimal dynamic path of tariffs to protect infant industries when a country initiates a process to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The framework is based on the model of Melitz (2005) in which externalities associated with dynamic learning-by-doing provide a rationale for infant industry protection. Unlike the original model, this paper assumes that there is a time limit for protection: after a fixed number of years, tariffs are required to be constant over time at a low level. This setup reflects the nature of the actual WTO agreement. This model is solved analytically to derive quantitative implications for the optimal tariff path, unlike in Melitz (2005), where only qualitative analyses are undertaken. An interesting result emerges: conventional wisdom is that a country in this situation should reduce the tariff rate gradually over time so that it converges to its long-run rate at the terminal date of protection. By contrast, this paper finds that, in some plausible scenarios, the optimal time path of the tariff can be upward sloping. A numerical analysis applied to the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, a typical infant industry in a country joining the WTO, confirms such a pattern.