Domestic lobbying and foreign direct investment. The role of policy instruments
AbstractFollowing the Common Agency approach to political equilibrium, we examine how domestic interest groups can influence national policies toward FDI and how the choice of instrument by the government can affect lobbying activities. Domestic firms lobby for lower subsidies when a discriminatory subsidy on FDI is applied. However, when a subsidy is applied uniformly to both groups, they may lobby for higher subsidies. The nature of lobbying is also different for proportional and lump-sum profit subsidies when uniformly applied. The qualitative effect of the number of domestic firms or the degree of corruption on the equilibrium depends on the choice of instruments. Finally, with the help of numerical simulation, we examine whether there is any potential conflict between the government and the lobby groups on the choice of the instrument.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.
Volume (Year): 16 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Kayalica, Ozgur M. & Espinosa-Ramirez, Rafael S., 2009. "Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 63-69, January.
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