This paper explores the relationship between trade and the regulation of what are otherwise open-access resources when enforcement of property rights is costly. When enforcement costs are significant, environmental property rights are only adopted and enforced when the potential resource rents exceed the regulatory cost. Since trade affects the magnitude of these rents, trade can affect the willingness to regulate. One of the most striking consequences of the presence of an enforcement cost is that the decision to liberalize trade, even at autarkic prices, can result in a switch in the regulatory regime and potentially reduce economic welfare.
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