Rent-Seeking and Ex Post Acceptance of Reforms in Higher Education
AbstractResistance to reduced government intervention in the management of higher education institutions is commonly observed in Continental Europe. We offer a theoretical argument to describe how rent seeking through ex-ante fierce resistance to reform in tertiary education is compatible with a widespread ex-post adoption of reforms which liberate universities from suffocating state control.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.
Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Michael Mitsopoulos & Theodore Pelagidis, 2007. "Rent-Seeking and Ex Post Acceptance of Reforms in Higher Education," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 177-192.
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- Michael Mitsopoulos & Theodore Pelagidis, 2010. "The case for abolishing the higher education state monopoly in Continental Western Europe," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(1), pages 36-52, January.
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