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Do Natural Disasters Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption?

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  • Quang Nguyen

Abstract

This study explores the link between natural disasters and corruption at the local government level. We examine whether a natural disaster affects official households more favourably than non-official households. We find that natural disasters decrease nonofficial household expenditures significantly, however, they have negligible effect on official household expenditures. Meanwhile, both kinds of households experience similar reduction in incomes, and have much the same disaster coping strategies. Together, the results imply that local officials may receive unobserved monetary compensation – we define as corruption – in the aftermath of natural disasters.

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  • Quang Nguyen, 2017. "Do Natural Disasters Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(1), pages 156-172, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:53:y:2017:i:1:p:156-172
    DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2016.1187724
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    2. Lee, Hanol & Moumbark, Toure, 2022. "Climate change, corruption, and business bribes in South Asia," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    3. Michael Berlemann & Thi Xuyen Tran, 2021. "Tropical Storms and Temporary Migration in Vietnam," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 47(4), pages 1107-1142, December.
    4. Daniela Wenzel, 2021. "Droughts and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 3-29, October.
    5. Federica Cacciatore & Fabrizio Mascio & Alessandro Natalini, 2022. "Do Economic Recovery Packages Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption and Mismanagement? The Case of Italy in the Aftermath of the Covid-19 Pandemic," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 527-544, September.
    6. Michael Breen & Robert Gillanders & Caroline McMullan, 2024. "Corruption, homelessness and disasters," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 70-83, January.
    7. Wenzel, Daniela, 2018. "Droughts and Corruption," Working Paper 181/2018, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    8. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei & Ho, Shan-Ju & Wu, Ting-Pin, 2021. "The impact of natural disaster on energy consumption: International evidence," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

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