Price policy, poverty, and power within rural West African households

This paper explores the impact of agricultural price policy on poverty in West Africa, a region in which prices are an important tool for raising rural household incomes. A game-theoretic, collective model of household income generation and resource allocation is developed that incorporates three features typical of West African rural households: preference heterogeneity among women and men, individual resource control, and power-mediated bargaining over resource control in the face of changes in households' economic environments. To explore price effects, the model is used to simulate the income impacts of large increases in cotton prices accompanying fast-paced agricultural liberalisation in Burkina Faso in the 1980s. The paper shows that where resources are controlled individually by household members, rather than pooled, Pareto efficiency in income generation does not hold. The impact of agricultural price policy on poverty is mediated by bargaining over resource control within households. Both the relative bargaining power of women and men and the degree of preference heterogeneity between them play fundamental roles in the outcome of such bargaining. The results point to a lower ability of households to take advantage of price incentives and thereby raise their incomes than a unitary household model, in which preferences do not differ and resources are pooled, predicts. They suggest that the effectiveness of price policy in reducing poverty in the region would be enhanced by taking into account the incentive structure within households as well as individual household members' ability to bargain over the benefit and cost streams flowing from price changes.